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PART 1: GENERAL INFORMATION
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this Bench Memorandum is to provide judges in the Niag-
ara Moot Court Competition a summary of the basic factual and legal issues
in the 2012 Niagara Problem (the "Compromis"). This Bench Memorandum
should be read in conjunction with the teams' briefs that you are judging; the
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Compromis, which is in essence a stipulation of facts agreed to by the two
Parties; and the Corrections/Clarifications which supplements the Compro-
mis. The Compromis is intended to present the competitors with a balanced
problem, such that each side has strengths and weaknesses in its case. This
Bench Memorandum is not meant to be an exhaustive treatise on the legal
issues raised in the Compromis, and Judges should not be surprised when, in
evaluating either a Brief or an oral argument, they see arguments or authori-
ties not discussed in this memorandum. Their absence from this Bench
Memorandum does not suggest that such arguments are not relevant or credi-
ble.
1I. SYNOPSIS OF THE FACTS
The 2012 Niagara Moot Court Case concerns two issues: First, whether
the (fictional) Canadian humanitarian intervention into the State of Tangoon
was lawful under international law? And second, whether the (fictional) Ca-
nadian apprehension of Tangoon's leader, Ishmael Balthasar, and U.S. na-
tional Clyde Barett, for surrender to the International Criminal Court, is law-
ful under international law.
A. Key Names/Places:
Tangoon: A State situated on the mountainous western half of the Pacific
island of Tanmutra, ruled by a religious regime that adheres to an ultra-
orthodox form of the Tanmutran religion.
Raffliki Balthasar: Tanmutran High Priest who led Tangoon as Head of
State from its independence in 1960 until recently turning power over to his
younger brother, Ishmael Balthasar.
Ishmael Balthasar: Current de facto leader of Tangoon, who holds the ti-
tle Minister of the Interior.
Mont Demon: Tangoon Mountain (elevation 7,100 feet) that contains the
world's largest known deposit of cobaltite, from which the strategic mineral
cobalt is derived.
Demonville: Tangoon's largest village (pop. 14,000). The village is lo-
cated on the lower elevations of the south face of Mont Demon.
Geomin Corp: U.S. incorporated multinational mining company.
Clyde Barrett: U.S. citizen who is CEO and chief geologist of Geomin
Corp.
Samutra: State situated on the eastern half of the Pacific island of
Tanmutra, ruled by a democratic government.
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B.Key Facts/Dates:
1991: Tangoon and Samutra are both admitted into the United Nations.
2010: Samutra becomes Party to the ICC Treaty.
2007: An extremely rich cobaltite vein is discovered on the north face of
Mont Demon in Tangoon. U.S. company Geomin Corp. enters into a con-
tract with Tangoon (signed by Ishmael Balthasar) for exclusive rights to mine
the site of the cobaltite vein on Mont Demon for 20 years in return for an
annual payment to the Tangoon regime of $20 million. Geomin Corp., in
turn, enters into a twenty-year contract with the U.S. Defense Logistics
Agency Strategic Materials to provide all of the cobalt mined at Mont De-
mon to the United States Government at a price of $20 a pound (15,000 tons
were provided in 2010).
January 2011: Geomin Corp. discovers that the village of Demonville is
situated directly on top of a second extremely rich cobaltite vein, located
very close to the surface. Residents of the village turn down Geomin Corp's
offer to purchase the land for a mine.
April 15, 2011: Clyde Barrett of Geomin Corp. meets with Ishmael Bal-
thasar to urge Balthasar to forcibly relocate the Demonville residents in re-
turn for an extra $50 million per year from Geomin. Balthasar agrees to do
so. Notes of the meeting are recorded in Balthasar's diary.
May 23, 2011: Barrett and Balthasar meet again. Barrett provides Bal-
thasar weather reports of an approaching tropical cyclone and suggests the
huge storm could provide the opportunity that Balthasar was looking for to
rid the villagers from the new mining site. Notes of this meeting are also
recorded in Balthasar's diary.
May 25, 2011: Tropical Cyclone "Kodo" sweeps through the area of the
Pacific Ocean where Samutra and Tangoon are located, battering the island
with winds as strong as 160 mph, over 40 inches of rain, and waves as high
as 20 feet. The government of Samutra issues timely warnings and takes
effective steps to protect its population from the massive storm. In contrast,
warnings were issued in Tangoon only to members of the ruling ultra-
orthodox religious elite; the Tangoon authorities did nothing to notify the
Tangoon civilian population of the imminent danger.
May 30, 2011: U.N. Secretary General issues a report on the situation in
Tangoon after the Cyclone, which documents that most of the civilian popu-
lation of Tangoon was rendered homeless and without potable drinking wa-
ter, and thousands of unburied corpses were present throughout the lowlands
and in the rivers flowing east to Samutra. The village of Demonville was
especially hard hit by mudslides, which destroyed nearly all of its structures.
The day after the cyclone, Geomin Corp. began blasting and excavating a
massive open-pit cobaltite/cobalt mining site on land that had been previous-
ly occupied by the Demonville residents. According to eye-witness ac-
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counts, Geomin Corp. was using a form of slave labor at the site provided by
the Tangoon government under its so-called "National Service Program."
The Secretary General observed that following the storm the Tangoon regime
had refused offers of humanitarian assistance from international NGOs and
several States, and had taken no action to dispose of the thousands of dis-
eased and rotting corpses, despite the Secretary General's warning that the
unburied corpses were spreading diseases including cholera, typhoid, and
dysentery to downstream populations in both Tangoon and Samutra, and that
thousands more would die in both countries if immediate action was not tak-
en to address the spread of the disease and dispose of the corpses.
May 30, 2011: The government of Samutra refers the situation to the In-
ternational Criminal Court and requested that the ICC bring charges against
Ishmael Balthasar for Crimes Against Humanity for his wanton actions that
were directly responsible for tens of thousands of deaths and the spread of
disease in both Tangoon and Samutra. ICC opens an investigation.
May 30, 2011: The government of Samutra requested an emergency ses-
sion of the U.N. Security Council to address the humanitarian crisis in
Tangoon. U.S. threatens to veto French proposed resolution which would
have authorized a coalition of willing States "to use all necessary means to
enter Tangoon and deliver vital humanitarian aid to its suffering people and
take steps to prevent the spread of disease from decomposing corpses. No
subsequent action was taken by the Council to respond to the crisis.
June 2, 2011: At an emergency special session, the U.N. General Assem-
bly, invoking its "Uniting for Peace" authority, adopted Resolution
A/RES/65/299, recommending "all necessary means" to deliver humanitarian
aid to the people of Tangoon.
June 3, 2011: Acting at the request of Samutra, the Government of Cana-
da sends the HMCS Algonquin, an Iroquois Class destroyer with a comple-
ment of 200 crew and commandos, to Samutra/Tangoon on a humanitarian
relief operation.
June 7, 2011: Canadian commandos land on the island and employ ex-
plosives to demolish several portions of the wall separating Samutra and
Tangoon.
-- One hundred twenty armed Canadian commandos accompanying 500
medical and relief workers in 100 aid trucks from Samutra then entered
Tangoon through the gaps in the border wall, and distributed food, clothing,
medicine, and temporary shelters to the surviving Tangoon population.
-- The Samutran relief workers also begin the process of disposing of the
thousands of diseased and rotting corpses.
-- A group of Tangoon Security personnel led by Ishmael Balthasar tries
to block the convoy of aid trucks as it neared the ruins of Demonville. Cana-
dian commandos take Balthasar into custody and confiscate his incriminating
diary.
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-- Canadian commandos came upon Geomin's blasting and excavating
operations at Demonville. Seeing Tangoon workers engaged in conditions of
slave-labor for Geomin, the commandos shut down the operation by disa-
bling the bull dozers, excavators, and scooptrams and apprehend Clyde Bar-
rett, who was running the operation.
-- Canadian commandos transport Balthasar and Clyde back to the Algon-
quin, docked at the Port of Samutra, where the two men have been held to
this day in the ship's brig.
June 8, 2011: Canada submits a letter to the Security Council, briefing
the Council as to its actions in Tangoon.
June 9, 2011: Canada/Samutra turn over Balthasar's incriminating diary
to the ICC Prosecutor.
June 10, 2011: The government of Tangoon tells the United States that
"the Mont Demon mines shall be shut down until Canada returns Ishmael
Balthasar to Tangoon. If the United States wants our cobalt, it will need to
obtain the return of our beloved leader."
June 15, 2011: The United States protested that Canada had violated
Tangoon's territorial sovereignty under Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter
when the Canadian commandos broke through the border wall and entered
Tangoon's territory, employing deadly force against the Tangoon security
forces. The U.S. further protested that Canada violated international law
when it abducted Ishmael Balthasar and U.S. citizen Clyde Barrett from
Tangoon, that the ICC does not have jurisdiction over the nationals of non-
Party States for actions taken outside the territory of a State Party, and that
Canada's actions violated Ishmael Balthasar's head of state immunity. Ac-
cording to the United States, their abduction and detention by Canada has
caused a substantial disruption in America's supply of cobalt, a strategic
mineral vital to its ongoing military actions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya.
The United States therefore called on Canada to immediately release Ishmael
Balthasar and Clyde Barrett.
June 20, 2011: Based on the Secretary-General's Report and the incrimi-
nating diary, the ICC issues an arrest warrant for Balthasar and Barrett,
charging them with crimes against humanity (but not genocide).
June 22, 2011: Canada responds to U.S. protest, arguing that its actions
were justified under the principle of collective self-defense to protect Samu-
tra from the spread of deadly disease from Tangoon, that the action was au-
thorized by the U.N. General Assembly under its "Uniting for Peace" author-
ity, and that the intervention was consistent with the "Responsibility to Pro-
tect" doctrine, and therefore did not violate international law. Canada also
argued that the apprehension and detention of Ishmael Balthasar and Clyde
Barrett was permissible because they had been responsible for serious inter-
national crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC. Canada suggested that the
two countries enter into high-level talks to further discuss this matter, and
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said that it would postpone surrendering Balthasar and Barrett to the ICC
until after such talks were undertaken.
August 29, 2011: Canada and U.S. submit dispute to the ad hoc jurisdic-
tion of the International Court of Justice.
C. List of Legal Issues (each of these issues is analyzed in part II below)
I. Whether Canada's intervention into Tangoon was lawful under interna-
tional law?
A. Was the Canadian armed intervention justified by the Responsi-
bility to Protect doctrine?
1. Does R2P apply to environmental catastrophes or just man-
made actions such as genocide and crimes against humanity?
2. Do the Tangoon leader's actions constitute an act of geno-
cide? Was it justified by religious beliefs?
3. Does the R2P doctrine require Security Council authoriza-
tion?
B. Was the Canadian armed intervention justified by the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly Resolution?
1. Based on past precedent, should the resolution be read as au-
thorizing armed intervention?
2. Based on its negotiating record, should the resolution be read
as authorizing armed intervention?
3. Can the U.N. General Assembly legitimately authorize armed
intervention under the "United for Peace" precedent?
4. Does the Uniting for Peace resolution apply where there is a
threatened veto but the Security Council never brought the is-
sue to a vote?
C. Was the Canadian armed intervention justified under the doctrine
of collective self-defense? Can self-defense apply to the threat of
pollution?
1. Can polluting a down-stream neighboring State constitute a
biological "attack"for purposes of the doctrine of self-
defense?
2. Was Canada's response necessary and proportionate? Did it
unnecessarily violate religious practices regarding burial?
8 [Vol. 37, No. I]
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II. Whether Canada's apprehension, detention, and proposed surrender to
the ICC of Ishmael Balthasar and Clyde Barrett are lawful under internation-
al law?
A. Was the apprehension justified under the Law of War and Human
Rights Law?
1. Was Balthasar's apprehension justified under the law of war
as a military action to protect the aid convoy from attack?
2. Was Barrett's apprehension justified as a means to stop hu-
man rights abuses in progress?
B. Was the detention lawful under the Mala Captus bene detentis
doctrine?
If Balthsar's and Barrett's initial apprehensions were unlaw-
ful, is their detention nonetheless lawful because there was a sub-
sequent ICC arrest warrant? In other words, does the mala cap-
tus bene detentis principle apply to the ICC?
C. Can the ICC exercise jurisdiction over nationals of a non-party
state who take action in the territory of a non-party state if the result
is massive deaths within the territory of a State Party to the ICC
Statute?
1. Does the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties prevent
the ICC from exercising Jurisdiction over the nationals of
non-party States?
2. Does the objective territorial basis ofjurisdiction (the effects
test) apply to the question of whether an act was committed
within the territory of a State Party to the ICC?
D. Did Canada violate Balthasar's Head of State immunity when it
captured and/or subsequently detained him for eventual surrender to
the ICC?
1. Does Head of State immunity apply to a de facto Head of
State who is not the dejure Head of State?
2. Does Head of State immunity apply to persons captured for
trial by the ICC?
III. SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
This section is an introduction to public international law and the Interna-
tional Criminal Court for judges who might not have professional experience
or training in the field. Feel free to quickly skim through this section if you
have judged International Law Moot Courts in the past and/or feel that you
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have a good familiarity with the general principles of international law.
There are important distinctions between international law and domestic le-
gal systems. The most significant for the international law moot judge is the
rigid definition of what sources of law are acceptable before the Court.
A. General
The conduct and rules of the International Court of Justice (the "ICJ") are
governed by the Statute of the International Court of Justice (the "ICJ Stat-
ute"). Under Article 38(1) of its Statute, the International Court of Justice
may consider the following sources of international law in order to decide
disputes before it:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, es-
tablishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting States;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice ac-
cepted as law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
(d) judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly quali-
fied publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law.
Commentators disagree as to whether these sources are listed in order of
importance.
Judges from common-law systems should note the status of precedent.
Article 59 of the ICJ Statute deprives decisions of the Court any status as
precedent, stating, "[t]he decision of the Court has no binding force except
between the parties and in respect of that particular case." In practice, how-
ever, the ICJ often cites its prior decisions, and those of its predecessor, the
Permanent Court of International Justice, as persuasive authority, pursuant to
Article 38(l)(d). Additionally, the Court frequently evaluates rules of cus-
tomary international law in its opinions and subsequently relies upon those
evaluations in later decisions.
Decisions by other tribunals are dealt with in the discussion in Subsection
E ("Decisions and Publicists") infra.
Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly are not, of them-
selves, binding before the Court. Although Resolutions may be evidence of
customary international law, the General Assembly's position in international
law is not analogous to that of a domestic legislature, and resolutions of the
General Assembly do not create positive international law.
10 [Vol. 37, No. I1]
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B. Treaties
Treaties are agreements between and among States, by which parties ob-
ligate themselves to act, or refrain from acting, according to the terms of the
treaty. Rules regarding treaty procedure and interpretation are defined in the
1959 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties' (the "VCLT"), which is
accepted by both the United States and Canada as Customary International
Law.
The fundamental principle relating to treaties, reiterated in Article 26 of
the VCLT, is that of pacla sunt servanda: "Every treaty in force is binding
upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith." In other
words, once a State becomes a party to a treaty, it is bound by that treaty.
Article 27 of the VCLT provides that a State cannot plead its Constitution,
domestic laws, or domestic court cases as an excuse for non-performance of
a treaty obligation.
Article 34 of the VCLT adds that a treaty is generally not binding on a
State which is not party to the treaty, and does not create rights or obligations
for such a State. Article 18 tempers this rule with respect to States that have
signed - but not yet ratified - a treaty: "A State is obliged to refrain from acts
which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when it has signed the
treaty. . .." pending ratification, unless it has "made its intention clear not to
become a party to the treaty." For example, a State that has signed but not
ratified a treaty forbidding testing of nuclear weapons would not be held to
the minute procedural details of the treaty; however, actual nuclear-weapons
testing by the State would probably be seen as a violation of international
law, constituting a breach of the "object and purpose" of the treaty.
The treaties potentially relevant to this case, to which both Canada and
the United States are parties, include: the U.N. Charter, the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Addi-
tional Protocols of 1977, the Genocide Convention, the International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights.
Even if a State is not party to a treaty, a treaty may serve as evidence of
customary international law. Article 38 of the VCLT recognizes this "back-
door" means by which a treaty may become binding on non-parties. Judges
should be aware, however, that situations arise where some provisions of a
treaty may reflect or codify customary international law, while other parts do
not.
1 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
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The Statute of the International Criminal Court
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is governed by the Rome Statute
(ICC Statute), which entered into force in 2002. There are currently 120
countries that are party to the ICC Statute. Note, while Canada and Samutra
are party to the ICC Statute, the United States and Tangoon are not.
Pursuant to Article 5 of the ICC Statute, the ICC has jurisdiction over (a)
the crime of genocide; (b) crimes against humanity; and (c) war crimes. But,
according to Articles 12 and 13 of the ICC Statute, the ICC only has jurisdic-
tion when one of these crimes were committed (1) by a national of a State
Party, or (2) in the territory of a State Party, or (3) when the Security Council
refers the case to the ICC. In the 2012 Niagara Problem, jurisdiction is based
on the theory that the crimes occurred (under the effects doctrine) in the terri-
tory of Samutra.
The 2012 Niagara Moot Court problem involves allegations of crimes
against humanity, which are defined in Article 7 of the Statute as "any of the
following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:
(a) Murder;
(b) Extermination;
(c) Enslavement;
(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population;
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty
in violation of fundamental rules of international law;
(f) Torture;
(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy,
enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of
comparable gravity;
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as de-
fined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recog-
nized as impermissible under international law, in connection
with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court;
(i) Enforced disappearance of persons;
(j) The crime of apartheid;
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally caus-
ing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or
physical health.
C. Customary International Law
12 [Vol. 37, No. 1]
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The second source of international law is customary international law. A
rule of customary international law is one that, whether or not it has been
codified in a treaty, has binding force of law because the community of
States treats it and views it as a rule of law. In contrast to treaty law, a rule of
customary international law is binding upon a State whether or not it has
affirmatively assented to that rule. The exception to this is that a State that
has been "a persistent objector" to the rule of customary international law
will not be bound by it.
In order to prove that a given rule has become a rule of customary interna-
tional law, one must prove two elements: widespread state practice and opin-
io juris - the mutual conviction that the recurrence (of state practice) is the
result of a compulsory rule.
"State practice" is the material element of customary international law,
and simply means that a sufficient number of states behave in a regular and
repeated manner consistent with the customary norm. As alluded to above,
State practice may also be shown when a sufficient number of States sign,
ratify, and accede to a convention. There is some dispute among commenta-
tors as to whether the practice of a small number of states in a particular re-
gion can create "regional customary international law" or whether the prac-
tice of particularly affected states, e.g. in the area of space law or antitrust
law, can create custom that binds states which later become affected by these
issues, although the ICJ appears to have acknowledged the possibility. 2
Opinio juris is the psychological or subjective element of customary in-
ternational law. It requires that the State action in question be taken out of a
sense of legal obligation, as opposed to mere expediency. Put another way,
opiniojuris, is the "conviction of a State that it is following a certain practice
as a matter of law and that, were it to depart from the practice, some form of
sanction would, or ought to, fall on it."3
Customary international law is shown by reference to treaties, decisions
of national and international courts, national legislation, diplomatic corre-
spondence, opinions of national legal advisers, and the practice of interna-
tional organizations. Each of these items might be employed as evidence of
State practice, opinio juris, or both.
With respect to the burden of proof, in The North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases, the ICJ stated that the party asserting the existence of a rule of cus-
tomary international law bears the burden of proving the existence of such a
rule.
2 North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 74 (Feb. 20).
3 MARK E. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES 4 (1985).
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D. General Principles of Law
The third source of international law consists of "general principles of
law." Such principles are gap-filler provisions: on occasion, the ICJ must
have recourse to rules typically found in domestic courts and domestic legal
systems in order to address procedural and other issues.
The bulk of recognized general principles are procedural in nature. For
example, the laws regarding burden of proof and admissibility of circumstan-
tial evidence. Many others, for example estoppel, waiver, unclean hands,
necessity, and force majeure, may sound to a common-law practitioner as
equitable doctrines. The principle of general equity in the interpretation of
legal documents and relationships is one of the most widely cited general
principles of international law. The ICJ has upheld the application of equita-
ble principles generally in, among other cases, the North Sea Continental
Shelf Cases (1969); its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International
Justice, recognized equitable principles as part and parcel of international law
in The Diversion of Water from the Meuse.4
It is important to note, however, that "equity" in this sense is a source of
international law, brought before the court under Article 38(1)(c) of the Stat-
ute of the ICJ. It is an inter legem application of equitable principles, and not
a power of the Court to decide the merits of the case ex aequo et bono, a sep-
arate matter treated under Article 38(2) of the Statute.
E. Decisions and Publicists
The filal source of international law is judicial decisions and teachings of
scholars. This category is described as "a subsidiary means of finding the
law." Judicial decisions and scholarly writings are, in essence, research aids
for the Court, used for example to support or refute the existence of a cus-
tomary norm, to clarify the bounds of a general principle or customary rule,
or to demonstrate state practice under a treaty.
Judicial decisions, whether from international tribunals or from domestic
courts, are useful to the extent they address international law directly or
demonstrate a general principle.
"Teachings" refers simply to the writings of learned scholars. Many stu-
dent competitors make the mistake of believing that every single published
article constitutes an Article 38(1)(d) "teaching." However, the provision is
expressly limited to teachings of "the most highly qualified publicists." For
international law generally, this is a very short list, and includes names like
Grotius, Lauterpacht, and Brownlie. Within the context of a specific field of
4 Diversion of Water from Meuse (Neth. v. BeIg.), 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 70, 76-78
(June 28).
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international law - for example, environmental law or law of the sea - there
are additional experts who would be regarded within their field as "highly
qualified publicists."
IV. BURDENS OF PROOF
In the Corfu Channel Case,5 the ICJ set out the burdens of proof applica-
ble to cases before it. The Applicant (in this case Canada) normally carries
the burden of proof with respect to factual allegations contained in its claim,
by a preponderance of the evidence. In the case of counter-claims (the sec-
ond issue in the present case), the Respondent (here, the United States) bears
the burden of proof.
Participants cannot, however, be held responsible for the lack of infor-
mation in the Compromis. They can only be held responsible for the quality
of their argument in light of this lack of detail. Judges should not dwell on
the evidentiary gaps unless the competitors have themselves drawn implausi-
ble or unsupportable inferences.
PART 2: LEGAL ANALYSIS
I. WHETHER CANADA'S INTERVENTION INTO TANGOON WAS
LAWFUL UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW?
A. Was the Canadian armed intervention justified by the Responsibility to
Protect doctrine?
1. Does R2P apply to environmental catastrophes or just man-made ac-
tions such as genocide and crimes against humanity?
The United Nations adopted the Responsibility to Protect doctrine
("R2P") at the 2005 World Summit as a reaction to the NATO intervention to
halt ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in 1999, as well as the international cominu-
nity's failure to respond to the Rwandan genocide in 1994.6 The doctrine
was codified in a report by the International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty (ICISS), established by Canada in 2000, and later endorsed
by the General Assembly and Security Council.7 There is presently no inter-
Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6).
6 Mission Statement, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ADVISOR ON THE PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE,
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/index.shtml (last visited Sept. 15, 2011).
7 Jayshree Bajoria, The Dilemma ofHumanitarian Intervention, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, http://www.cfr.org/human-rights/dilemma-humanitarian-intervention/pl6524 (last
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national consensus about the scope and application of the doctrine, nor
whether it reflects customary international law.
R2P is a doctrine aimed at stopping, through military intervention by U.N.
member states, "mass atrocity crimes"-a term that encompasses genocide,
war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing-through existing
international frameworks. In order for a country to intervene under R2P, that
country must normally first get authorization from the U.N. Security Council.
R2P draws its power from Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, and specifically,
Article 39, which provides: "The Security Council shall determine the exist-
ence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and
shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in ac-
cordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace
and security."8 If, however, the Security Council is paralyzed by a Perma-
nent Member veto, R2P would arguably permit the General Assembly to
authorize force under its "Uniting for Peace" authority (discussed below).
One of the criticisms of the R2P doctrine is that its scope is too narrow; it
only addresses four crimes.9 An instance in which there is some international
support for expanding the scope of R2P is to protect civilians from natural
disasters in cases in which their own government refuses to accept outside
aid.
Also termed environmental disasters, an environmental catastrophe is a
sudden onset of a calamity or accident resulting from one or a combination of
natural, technological, industrial, or human-caused factors.' 0 There are or-
ganizations, such as the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs, as well as Non-Governmental Organizations such as CARE, that
have been established to respond to these tragedies as they occur. However,
these organizations require permission from the countries they work in to be
there, and generally have to be invited in before they can provide assis-
tance."
The question of whether R2P applied to environmental disasters was de-
bated in the context of Myanmar's handling of Cyclone Nargis in 2008. The
cyclone caused the "worst natural disaster in the history" of Myanmar.12
Despite the very high and increasing death toll, the immense destruction of
visited Sept. 15, 2011).
8 U.N. Charter chap. VII.
9 Aidan Hehir, The Responsibility to Protect: Sound and Fury Signifying Nothing?, 24
INT'L RELATIONS 218 (2010).
to UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, Environ-
mental Emergencies, http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordination-tools/environmental-
emergencies (last visited Sept. 16, 2011)
1 CARE INT'L, http://www.care-intemational.org/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
12 Bruce Loudon, Cyclone is a Sign of Things to Come, THE AUSTRALIAN, May 9, 2008, at
9.
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property and the very real danger of higher fatalities due to lack of water,
food, and the spread of disease, the military junta of Myanmar initially re-
sisted accepting international aid.13 The international community strongly
condemned this action by the junta, with the French U.N. ambassador claim-
ing Myanmar's refusal to allow increased aid into the country could lead to a
true crime against humanity." U.K. Prime Minister Gordon Brown accused
the junta of "allowing the disaster to grow into a man-made catastrophe
through its failure to act,"' 4 and there were even a few claims of genocide
due to the rapidly increasing death toll in the aftermath of the storm. It was
only after severe international pressure and the threat by France to intervene
without Myanmar's consent, that Myanmar finally allowed humanitarian aid
into the country.' 5
While R2P's scope is limited, it does cover crimes against humanity. As
the French Ambassador pointed out during the Myanmar situation, a gov-
ernment's refusal to accept aid after an environmental disaster can arguably
equate to a crime against humanity if the refusal leads to systematic and
widespread deaths. The French Foreign Minister proposed "that the U.N.
Security Council invoke the responsibility to protect to authorize the delivery
of aid without the consent of the Myanmar/Burma government."" The Chi-
nese government, however, responded by insisting that the Responsibility to
Protect doctrine did not cover natural disasters. This claim was supported by
the Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, which found that
there was "no prima facie case for arguing that the [Myanmar] regime's fail-
ure to provide full access to humanitarian organizations in the wake of Cy-
clone Nargis triggers the Responsibility to Protect principle."' 7
In the present case, the United States may argue that failure to permit out-
side aid is not the same thing as affirmatively committing a crime against
humanity. The U.S. argument will be based on U.N. Charter Article 2 (7),
which provides that "nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize
the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state."' 8 A fundamental aspect of state sover-
eignty is the right of a state to decide how to care for its own population,
13 India Urges Myanmar to Accept Global Aid, Junta Agrees, THAINDIAN NEWS (May 12,
2008, 9:11PM), http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/uncategorized/india-urges-myanmar-to-
accept-global-aid-junta-agrees-lead 10047982.html.
14 Burma Guilty ofInhuman Action, BBC ONLINE (May 17, 2008, 7:27PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uknews/politics/7406023.stm.
15 THAINDIAN NEWS, supra note 13.
16 ASIA-PACIFIC CENTRE FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, CYCLONE NARGIS AND THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2008), available at
http://www.r2pasiapacific.org/documents/Burma Brief2.pdf.
7 Id.
8 U.N. Charter art. 2(7).
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taking into account its own particular cultural mores. The United States will
further point out that the Myanmar situation did not indicate a consensus for
the application of R2P to environmental crises, and therefore Canada cannot
establish that its intervention was consistent with customary international
law. Finally, the United States may argue that if R2P is expanded too far this
will engender resistance to its use in cases for which it was designed, namely
those dealing with genocide and intentional crimes against humanity such as
in Rwanda.19
Canada will likely use the Myanmar case to illustrate how adapting R2P
to cover environmental disasters is not a new idea. While it was unnecessary
to invade Myanmar as the military junta eventually allowed humanitarian
aid, military intervention was seriously considered by international powers,
such as France. Canada may also point to the original version of R2P where
the commission included environmental or natural disasters as possible
events after which the international community could intervene if the state
failed in its responsibility to protect its population. The United States will
respond that in 2005, when the responsibility to protect doctrine was incorpo-
rated into the U.N. outcome document, environmental disasters had been
20dropped as a reason for intervention.
2. Do the Tangoon leader's actions constitute an act ofgenocide? Was it
justified by religious beliefs?
To determine whether the Tangoon situation might qualify as genocide or
attempted genocide, and therefore trigger the R2P doctrine, one must start
with the definition of genocide under the 1948 Genocide Convention, which
the ICJ has declared represents customary international law. Article 2 of the
Genocide Convention defines genocide as:
the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) killing members of the group;
(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group;
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life, calcu-
lated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
19 Bajoria, supra note 7.
20 World Summit Document, INTERNATIONAL COALITION FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT, http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php?option=com_ con-
tent&view=article&id=398 (last visited Sept. 15, 2011).
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(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group;
(e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.2'
This definition was later adopted by the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY),22 the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR), 2 3 and the ICC itself 24
Canada, setting out to prove that the actions of the Tangoon leadership
constitute Genocide, will find definition "c" most applicable to the situation
on the ground. In this case, the Tangoon leaders have both failed to warn the
people of the lowlands of the impending danger, and denied them aid when it
became available, thereby inflicting conditions of life so harsh as to kill the
villagers and destroy the physical structures of the village, all with the pur-
pose of clearing the land around the Demon Mine. Canada will argue that
this is with the intent to bring about the destruction of those people in its
care. Furthermore, the distinction drawn by the Tangoon leader that the peo-
ple of the lowlands are of an impure or untrue form of the state religion
would seem to emphasize that it is a distinct religious group that is being
purposefully targeted and culled.
Canada will likely cite the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and
Montenegro, of 2007, wherein the ICJ established that Serbia had breached
the Genocide Convention, but not, in fact, for committing it as an official
government act, nor for directly condoning it (although this was contentious
in the court, and not decided unanimously). Instead the Court found that in
the Serbian government's failure to prevent the Srebrenica massacre, it was
guilty of failing to prevent the genocide, and, in addition, was culpable for
not cooperating with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yu-
goslavia in punishing the architects.25 The parallels to the case in Tangoon
are readily drawn: even if Serbia was no more directly in control of the par-
amilitary elements of the country than Tangoon's leaders were of the Cy-
clone Kodo, they both had the opportunity, and indeed responsibility, to pro-
tect their populations from what amounted to genocidal conditions.
21 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide, art. 2, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S 277.
22 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 4, S.C.
Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
23 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 2, S.C. Res. 955, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
24 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 6, July 17, 1998 2187 U.N.T.S.
90.
25 Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 43 (Feb. 26).
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The United States, on the other hand, will point out that genocide is a spe-
cific intent crime, the perpetrators must act with the specific intent to destroy
the group. The Tangoon leaders, in contrast, denied aid because (1) their
religious beliefs prohibited use of medicines; or (2) they wanted to clear peo-
ple from the mining site in order to get more money from Geomin. Neither
of these reflect the intent to destroy a group. As to the first motivation, an
analogy can be made between the refusal to accept aid and the individual
right to refuse medical attention for religious reasons. Canada may point out,
however, that in the United States, adults may refuse lifesaving medical
techniques on religious grounds, but may not refuse on behalf of their chil-
dren. As to the second motivation, the ICJ in its Judgment on Genocide ex-
plicitly stated: "The expulsion of a group or part of a group does not in itself
suffice for genocide." 26 The United States may also cite the rejection of a
proposed 6th provision of the genocide convention, which would have barred
"measures intended to oblige members of a group to abandon their homes in
order to escape the threat of subsequent ill-treatment."2 7 In the end, the ar-
gument about genocide may not be key to the outcome of this case, since the
ICC has found that Balthazar's acts and omissions constitute a crime against
humanity, and under the R2P doctrine, intervention can be justified to halt
either genocide or crimes against humanity.
3. Does the R2P doctrine require Security Council authorization?
The question is whether Canada's intervention, or any humanitarian inter-
vention, under the doctrine of responsibility to protect, requires Security
Council authorization. After countries objected to the 1999 intervention of
Kosovo by NATO forces without Security Council authorization, the Secre-
tary General of the U.N., Kofi Annan, stated "if humanitarian intervention is,
indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a
Rwanda, to a Srebrenica-to gross and systematic violations of human rights
that offend every precept of our common humanity?" 2 8 In response to the
challenge set forth by the Secretary-General, Canada established the ICISS
with the mandate to find a method to reconcile the seemingly conflicting
notions of "human protection purposes and sovereignty." 29
26 Id. at para. 190.
27 William Schabas, On the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide: Introduction, Dec. 9, 1948, available at
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/pdf/ha/cppcg/cppcg e.pdf.
U.N. Secretary-General, We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st
Century, 48, U.N. Doc. A/54/2000 (March 27, 2000).
29 INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT XI (2001).
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Canada may argue that the U.N. Charter permits R2P intervention without
Security Council authorization under some circumstances. Article 2 (4) of
the U.N. Charter states that "[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or po-
litical independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the Pur-
poses of the United Nations."3 o Canada will argue, through a narrow inter-
pretation of the Charter, that its intervention of Tangoon under Article 2 (4)
was not "inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations" but rather it
was to uphold, promote and protect human rights; a motivation consistent
with the purposes of the U.N. 3 1 The United States will respond that regard-
less of Canada's purpose for intervention, Canada still violated the Charter.
Chapter VII gives the Security Council the power to authorize force, and also
to decide when force is not warranted.
Further, the United States will argue that the version of the R2P doctrine
that was adopted in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document and later
endorsed by the Security Council envisioned Security Council authorization
as a pre-requisite to R2P intervention. The Summit Outcome Document is a
General Assembly resolution that represents the conclusion of the 2005
World Summit, which was the first time that the doctrine of responsibility to
protect had been debated officially in the U.N. Paragraph 138 and 139 of the
2005 Summit Outcome Document constitute the agreed upon language of
responsibility to protect. Paragraph 139 of the document states:
[W]e are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and deci-
sive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with
the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and
in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropri-
ate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities
manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.32
Canada will argue that the language in the document does not make im-
plementation of R2P explicitly conditional on Security Council authorization,
but that the passage only indicates that the U.N. is prepared to take action
"through the Security Council." In response, the United States will point to
the Secretary-General's 2009 Report, which states that "[t]he responsibility
30 U.N. Charter art. 2(4).
31 BRIAN D. LEPARD, RETHINKING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: A FRESH LEGAL
APPROACH ON FUNDAMENTAL ETHICAL PRINCIPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD
RELIGIONS 335 (2002).
32 G.A. Res. 60/1, T 139, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sep. 16, 2005) [hereinafter Summit
Outcome].
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to protect does not alter . . . the legal obligations of the Member States to
refrain from the use of force except in conformity with the Charter."3 3 How-
ever, the statement is not explicit to the Security Council, and that conformi-
ty to the Charter includes the goals and purposes of the U.N. specifically the
maintenance of human rights. The debate returns to the language and pur-
poses of the Charter.
To shed light on this question, Canada and the United States may turn to
the historical precedent of humanitarian intervention, the predecessor to re-
sponsibility to protect. In 1999, NATO strategically bombed Yugoslavia to
prevent the ethnic killing of Albanians in Kosovo.34 The action was carried
out without Security Council authorization, but was later ratified by Security
Council Resolution 1244, which "Authorizes Member States and relevant
international organizations to establish an international security presence in
Kosovo . . . Canada will argue that this is an example of intervention
without authorization, but subsequently authorized by the Security Council,
which provides an example of how intervention is considered to be legiti-
mate. The use of force was for the sole purpose of protecting civilians from
ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. The United States will argue
that Security Council Resolution 1244 was retroactive approval, which is
missing in the case of Tangoon.
B. Was the Canadian armed intervention justified by the U.N. General As-
sembly Resolution?
1. Based on past precedent, should the resolution be read as authorizing
armed intervention?
U.N. General Assembly Resolution 65/299 was understood by Canada to
justify Canadian armed intervention in the crisis in Tangoon. The key text in
the resolution, where the words can be interpreted as allowing armed inter-
vention, is the phrase "Recommends that States in coordination with Samutra
employ all necessary means to ensure delivery of humanitarian aid and bring
an end to this humanitarian catastrophe." 3 6 Whether the use of "all necessary
means " authorizes the use of military force can be seen through past prece-
dent.
Over the years, the Security Council has used a variety of phrases that
have been interpreted as authorizing force. For example, Security Council
33 U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the Secre-
tary-General, 3, U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009).
34 LEPARD, supra note 31, at 337.
31 S.C. Res. 1244, 7, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1244 (June 10, 1999).
36 G.A. Res 65, 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/299 (Aug. 30, 2011).
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Resolution 83, adopted on the 27th of June 1950 in response to North Ko-
rea's invasion of South Korea, stated: "recommends that the Member Nations
of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as
may be necessary to repel the armed attack and restore international peace
and security to the area."37 This phrase was interpreted as authorizing armed
intervention, as demonstrated by the United States coming to the aid of South
Korea, with support from Canada, Australia, Greece and France while the
North Korean and Chinese armies received support from the Soviet Union.38
Note, China and the Soviet Union did not veto the resolution because at the
time, China was represented by the pro-west Nationalist Govermnent in Tai-
wan, and the Soviet Union was absent during the vote on the resolution in
protest of the exclusion of the People's Republic of China from the Council.
The intervention restored the border between North and South Korea to the
38th parallel and created a demilitarized zone between the two Koreas that
exists to this day.3 9
It would be forty more years before the Security Council approved anoth-
er use of force. In 1991, the Council adopted Resolution 678 in response to
the non-compliance of Iraq with earlier resolutions in the context of its inva-
sion of Kuwait. This Resolution "authorizes member states co-operating
with the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991
fully implements, as set forth in paragraph 1 above, the above-mentioned
resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution
660 ....... " 40 Pursuant to this resolution, a U.S.-led coalition of 34 Member
States launched Operation Desert Storm against Iraq, and forced the Iraqis
out of Kuwait. 41
Less than two years later, The Security Council passed a series of resolu-
tions regarding the disintegrating situation in the remains of Yugoslavia. The
most important of these, Resolution 770, requested that, "all states provide
the appropriate support for the actions undertaken in pursuance of this resolu-
tion," and demanded that, "all parties concerned take the necessary measures
to ensure the safety of the U.N. and other personnel engaged in the delivery
of humanitarian assistance."4 2 Acting under this authority, NATO carried out
a series of air strikes, until Serbia agreed to the Dayton Peace Accords on 21
November 1995.43
n S.C. Res. 83, S 6, U.N. Doc. S/Res/83 (June 27, 1950).
38 History and Reference, KOREAN WAR PROJECT,
htp://www.koreanwar.org/html/historyand-reference.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2011)
9Id.
40 S.C. Res. 678, T 2, U.N. Doc. S/Res/678 (Nov. 29, 1990).
41 DOUGLAS A. BORER, U.S. ARMY, INVERSE ENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM U.S.-IRAQ
RELATIONS: 1982-1990 U.S. ARMY PROFESSIONAL WRITING COLLECTION (2003).
42 S.C. Res. 770, 1 5-6, U.N. Doc. S/Res/770 (August 13, 1992).
43 Evolution of the Conflict, NATO HANDBOOK,
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The most recent humanitarian intervention concerned Libya, following
the severe repression of popular protests that began in February 2011 against
the government of Muammar Gaddafi.44 With the adoption of U.N. Resolu-
tion 1973, the Security Council authorized "member States ...... acting
nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements ...... to take
all necessary measures...... to protect civilians and civilian populated areas
under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya...... to take all neces-
sary measures to enforce compliance with the ban on flights...... calls up-
on all Member States ...... to provide assistance, including any necessary
over- flight approvals."45 While the text does not specifically call for armed
intervention, it was seen as "effectively authorizing the use of force in Lib-
ya,"4 which was undertaken by NATO, France, the United Kingdom and the
United States.
Canada will argue that the resolution recommending "all necessary
means " in this case is consistent with the past resolutions authorizing the use
of force. The United States will argue that the language is different from
"the necessary measures" language that the Security Council has employed
in recent cases. Moreover, the General Assembly's Tangoon Resolution
qualified the use to ensure delivery of humanitarian aid and bring an end to
this humanitarian catastrophe; it did not authorize the apprehension of the
Head of State of Tangoon. Further, the resolution recommended all neces-
sary means, it didn't authorize them.
2. Based on its negotiating record, should the resolution be read as au-
thorizing armed intervention?
The Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties, which also applies to inter-
pretation of U.N. Resolutions, permits the use of negotiating records when
the terms of the resolution are ambiguous. The explanations of vote issued
either immediately before or after the adoption of a resolution qualifies as the
negotiating record for this purpose. In this case, China, Canada, the United
States, and Russia each made a statement following the vote on the Resolu-
tion on Tangoon.
China, which abstained, stated that it did not interpret the resolution as au-
thorizing use for armed intervention. It explained its understanding that the
http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb050102.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2011).
4 Live Blog -Libya, ALJAZEERA (Feb. 17, 2011, 4:39AM),
http://blogs.aljazeera.net/middle-east/2011/02/17/live-blog-libya.
45 S.C. 1973, 4, 8-9, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1973 (Mar. 17 2011).
46 Security Council Authorizes All Necessary Measures to Protect Civilians in Libya, U.N.
NEWS CENTRE, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=37808 (last visited Sept. 13,
2011).
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Resolution's recommendation to "employ all necessary means" was only a
"recommendation that States work together to provide aid and bring an end
to the humanitarian catastrophe in Tangoon." "Necessary means" does not
imply use of force.
Canada's negotiating record states nothing about authorizing armed inter-
vention, but discusses "authorizing a humanitarian intervention." It explains
that "the international community will not sit idly by while a humanitarian
disaster unfolds. . ." It is unclear as to what action comprises "not sit[ting]
idly by." Canada will argue that in order to carry out a humanitarian inter-
vention, armed intervention is needed or is inevitable, but nothing in its
statement clarifies this for certain.
Russia's statement, on the other hand, clearly denotes that "employ[ing]
all necessary means," indicates that "Samutra and her allies may take force-
ful measures to ensure that humanitarian aid get to ... Tangoon." In addi-
tion, Russia cites a previous use of force (its intervention in South Ossetia) as
an example of what the Resolution would allow. Similarly, the statement of
the United States, while arguing that the General Assembly does not have the
authority to authorize the use for force, clearly implies that the General As-
sembly has purported to do so here.
3. Can the U.N. General Assembly legitimately authorize armed interven-
tion under the "Uniting for Peace" precedent?
At the core of this debate is the question of whether the powers provided
for in Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter are exclusive to the Security Council
or not. According to Article 39 of the Charter, the Security Council shall
determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act
of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures
shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore
international peace and security. 4 7
Additionally, Article 42 of the Charter accords the Security Council the
power to authorize the use of force to maintain and restore international
peace should other diplomatic and coercive measures fail. 48 Few, if any,
would question the Security Council's ability to determine threats to interna-
tional peace and security and act accordingly. However, when the Security
Council fails to act, or is paralyzed from acting because of the threat of a
veto by one of the Permanent Members, do the Chapter VII powers, namely
the ability to authorize force, become paralyzed as well?
During the Cold War, the Security Council was often at an impasse due to
disagreement amongst the "Permanent Five," veto-wielding members of the
47 U.N. Charter art. 39.
48 Id. art. 42.
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Council (France, the U.K., China, the USSR, and the United States). 49 When
the USSR continued to block the Security Council from taking action to as-
sist the Republic of Korea against aggression by North Korea, the General
Assembly, citing its "subsidiary responsibility with regard to international
peace and security," adopted Resolution 377 (V), known as the "Uniting for
Peace" Resolution.50 Under the authority of Uniting for Peace Resolution, if
the Security Council "because of lack of unanimity of the permanent mem-
bers, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security" the General Assembly may seize itself of the
matter and make recommendations for "collective measures...... including
the use of armed force when necessary." 5' This resolution has led to the
thought that when the Security Council fails to act, the General Assembly
may assume the powers and responsibilities listed in Chapter VII of the
Charter.
Canada will put forth this view-that when the Security Council fails to
act, the responsibility to determine threats to peace and act accordingly is
transferred to the General Assembly-and argue that under the banner of
"Uniting for Peace" the intervention in Tangoon was legitimate. In order to
convene an emergency General Assembly session under the "Uniting for
Peace" procedure, three preconditions must be met: (1) there must be a threat
to peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression; (2) there is lack of unanimity
in the Security Council; (3) as such, the Security Council is failing to exer-
cise its primary responsibility over the maintenance of international peace
and security.5 2 From Canada's point of view, the devastating impact of the
situation in Tangoon on neighboring Samutra represents a serious threat to
peace, and since the United States threatened to veto any Security Council
resolution regarding the situation, the Council is unable to perform its duty of
maintaining international peace. Thus, for Canada, all prerequisites for exer-
cising authority under "Uniting for Peace" have been fulfilled.
The United States, on the other hand, will argue that the threat of the veto
by one of the Permanent Members does not mean the Council is "failing" to
act and that this use of "Uniting for Peace" goes far and beyond what the
resolution has historically been used for. The United States will further ar-
gue that only the Security Council may authorize the use of force for purpos-
es other than self-defense, and any humanitarian military intervention with-
out a Security Council resolution, like the one in Tangoon, is contrary to in-
ternational law.
4 G.A. Res. 377 (V), U.N. Doc. A/RES/377 A (Nov. 3, 1950)
so Id.
5' Id. at para. 1.
52 Kamrul Hossein, The Complementary Role of the United Nations General Assembly in
Peace Management, 13 REV. INT'L L. & POL. 77 (2008).
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For the United States, the intervention in Tangoon stands in violation of
international law mainly because the Security Council did not adopt a resolu-
tion authorizing the use of force. The United States will likely rest the foun-
dation of its argument on numerous provisions of the U.N. Charter. Article
2(4) of the Charter explicitly prohibits the use of force against the "territorial
integrity or political independence of any state" 53 The only exceptions to this
rule as outlined by the Charter come from self-defense, found in Article 51,54
or Security Council resolutions, found in Article 42. As the intervention in
Tangoon arose from neither of these two exceptions, it would seem to be a
direct violation of Article 2(4). Thus the strongest evidence for exclusivity
of Security Council powers comes from the Charter itself
The language of Articles 39 and 42 specifically address the Security
Council as having the primary power to determine threats and authorize
forceful responses to maintain peace. These articles make it clear that the
Security Council should always be the first point of call when it comes to the
authorization of force. Furthermore, Articles 10-14 make it clear that the
Security Council and General Assembly cannot be substituted for one anoth-
er but are instead meant to complement each other. As such, the powers of
the Security Council cannot be transferred to the General Assembly, or as-
sumed by the General Assembly by default.56
In addition, the United States will argue that there remains "no constitu-
tional basis in the U.N. Charter for the General Assembly to override the
right of veto granted to permanent members of the Security Council in Arti-
cle 27 (3).",51 Simply being able to call forth the General Assembly and by-
pass a veto by claiming the Security Council is failing to act would under-
mine the authority of the Council. Furthermore, the fact that the Permanent
Members of the Council disagree is not proof in and of itself that they are
"paralyzed" or "failing to act." Rather, it can be argued that the Council is
"fulfilling its role as a discretionary, governing body of nations whose with-
holding of consent is indicative of their dissatisfaction with the proposed
action."58  To grant the General Assembly rights to bypass the Security
Council would "precipitate a constitutional crisis within the United Nations,
for they would pit the Assembly against those major powers in the Security
Council which had blocked the Council from responding to the humanitarian
" U.N. Charter art. 2., para.4.
54 Id. art. 51.
" Id. art. 42.
56 Hossein, supra note 52, at 83.
s7 Nicholas J. Wheeler, Operationalising the Responsibility to Protect: The Continuing
Debate Over Where Authority Should Be Located for the Use of Force, 3 NUPI REPORT 5
(2008).
58 Daniel H. Joyner, The Kosovo Intervention: Legal Analysis and a More Persuasive
Paradigm, 13 E.J.1.L. 597 (2002).
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crisis in the first place."5 9 In this sense, the United States could argue that
more harm would come from bypassing the Council's right to authorize force
than from the unfolding disaster in Tangoon.
Canada will agree that the Security Council is the first point of call for the
authorization of force, but will also insist it does not have to be the last.
When the Council fails to act, Resolution 377 (V) makes it clear that this
"does not relieve Member States of their obligations or the United Nations of
its responsibility under the Charter to maintain international peace and secu-
rity."60 It can then be argued that the "basis of the 'Uniting for Peace' resolu-
tion was to uphold the purposes and objectives of the United Nations, more
precisely, the maintenance of international peace and security."6' In this
sense, when the Security Council fails to perform its primary responsibility,
this responsibility becomes the duty of the General Assembly. Thus, in the
simplest of arguments, authorization of force by the General Assembly can-
not be said to violate Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter because the Assembly
was "playing the role that should have been played by the Security Coun-
cil." 62
Canada will further agree that the Security Council has primary power
over the maintenance of international peace and security, but contend that
this power is not exclusive. The U.N. Charter itself, in Article 27 (1), refers
to the Security Council as having "primary responsibility for the maintenance
of international peace and security" but does not say this responsibility is
absolute.6 3 This argument finds support in the advisory opinion of the Inter-
national Court of Justice in the Certain Expenses case.f Certain Expenses
involved disputes over the allocation of funds to General Assembly-
established Peace Keeping operations in the Middle East and the Congo. It
was argued that expenses related to operations for the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security should be dealt with exclusively by the Security
Council under their Chapter VII powers. The ICJ, however, held that "the
responsibility of the Security Council . . . is 'primary', not exclusive." 65 Ad-
ditionally, just as the Charter outlines the Security Council responsibilities,
so too does it make it abundantly clear that the General Assembly is to be
concerned with matters of international peace and security. The Court went
on to find that the General Assembly is not "barred from recommending en-
forcement action." This opinion can be seen to legitimize the General As-
s9 W. Michael Reisman, 10h Commission: Present Problems ofthe Use ofForce in Inter-
national Law, 72 I.D.L.-I.I.L. 169 (2007).
60 G.A. Res. 377 (V), supra note 49.
61 Hossein, supra note 52, at 84.
62 id
63 U.N. Charter art. 27, para. 1.
64 Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151 (July 20).
65 Id. at 163.
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sembly as having "secondary" powers to the Security Council, including the
ability to assume Chapter VII functions. The ICJ went so far as to equate the
General Assembly to the Security Council in its advisory opinion on The
Wall, when it stated, "the United Nations, and especially the General Assem-
bly and the Security Council, should consider what further action is required
to bring to an end the illegal situation." 6 It would then seem that the ICJ has
already come to the decision that powers of the Security Council are not ex-
clusive and can be used by the General Assembly.
The United States can point out that Certain Expenses involved peace
keeping operations in areas where conflict was ongoing; they were not hu-
manitarian interventions like the operation in Tangoon. Therefore, there
cannot be a reasonable comparison made between the two cases because
there is a marked difference between an armed humanitarian intervention and
the deployment of peacekeeping troops, which require the consent of the
territorial state.
4. Does the Uniting for Peace resolution apply where there is a threat-
ened veto but the Security Council never brought the issue to a vote?
According to the Uniting for Peace Resolution, an "emergency special
session shall be called if requested by the Security Council on the vote of any
seven members, or by a majority of the Members of the United Nations." 67
The annex further elaborated that:
Emergency special sessions pursuant to resolution 377 A (V)
shall be convened within twenty-four hours of the receipt by the
Secretary-General of a request for such a session from the Secu-
rity Council, on the vote of any seven members thereof, or of a
request from a majority of the Members of the United Nations
expressed by vote in the Interim Committee or otherwise, or of
the concurrence of a majority of Members as provided in rule 9.68
The resolution clearly stated that there does not need to be a vote by the
Security Council to legitimize the convening of an emergency special ses-
sion. One purpose of 377 A (V) is to ensure that international peace and
security are maintained even if the Security Council "because of lack of una-
nimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise [that] primary responsi-
6 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9).
67 G.A. Res. 377 (V), supra note 49, at 10-11.
68 id.
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bility." 6 9 For this reason, the burden to recognize when the Security Council
is not exercising its primary responsibility does not fall just to the Security
Council itself but to all members of the General Assembly.
There have been ten emergency special sessions called since 1956.70 The
Security Council has convened seven of these sessions, but only six were
convened due to a vote and subsequent veto by one of the permanent mem-
bers.7i The emergency special session that was convened on request from the
Security Council, without a vote and veto, was in 1958 in regards to the crisis
in Lebanon. 72 In this circumstance, the issue was not that a permanent mem-
ber used veto power, but that the Security Council was unable to devise any
solutions to the crisis at hand.73 In this circumstance, the Security Council
did not specifically cite Resolution 377 A (V) as the means for referring the
issue to the General Assembly, but did use the this specific language:
"[tiaking into account that lack unanimity of its permanent members ....
has prevented the Council from exercising its primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security, [d]ecides to call an emer-
gency special session of the General Assembly."74 Although Resolution 377
A (V) was not specifically cited, the language is identical to the resolution.
Members of the General Assembly requested the remaining three emergency
special sessions and the majority of members agreed to convene based on
those requests. 7 5 These special sessions were: (1) the question of Pakistan
requested by Senegal first in 1980, (2) the question of Namibia requested by
Zimbabwe in 1981, and (3) the question of Israel and Palestine requested by
Qatar first in 1997.76
Finally, in 1951, in regards to Communist China and Korea, recognizing
that permanent members of the Council would not agree, the Council voted
to remove the issue from its agenda. The General Assembly was in regular
session and took up the issue there.78 In this circumstance, Resolution 377 A
(V) was not cited but the issue was diverted to the General Assembly for
action and the following language was used in the resulting Resolution 498,
69 Christian Tomuschat, UNITED NATIONS, Uniting for Peace General Assembly Resolution
377 (): Introduction 1 (2008).
70 GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS, Emergency Special Sessions,
http://www.un.org/en/ga/sessions/emergency.shtml (last visited Sept. 26, 2011).
71 Tomuschat, supra note 69.
72 id.
7 Id.
74 S.C. Res. 129, U.N. Doc. S/RES 129 (Aug. 7, 1958).
7/383
75 Tomuschat, supra note 69.
76 id.
7 See RICHARD HISCOCKS, THE SECURITY COUNCIL: A STUDY IN ADOLESCENCE 292-93
(1973).
78 Id. at 289.
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"Noting that the Security Council because of lack of unanimity of the perma-
nent members, has failed to exercise its primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security in regard to Chinese Com-
munist intervention in Korea . . . The language clearly resembles that of
the Uniting for Peace Resolution.
Although in a majority of circumstances the Security Council did vote on
an issue and then refer it to the General Assembly, the examples given and
the wording of the Resolution itself seem to support that a Security Council
vote (and actual exercise of the veto) does not need to occur for an issue to
be taken up by the General Assembly.
C. Was the Canadian armed intervention justified under the doctrine of col-
lective self-defense? Can self-defense apply to the threat of pollution?
1. Can polluting a down-stream neighboring State constitute a biological
"attack "for purposes of the doctrine of self-defense?
Due to the large number of corpses rotting in Tangoon's lakes and
streams, an epidemic has been spreading throughout the country and into
neighboring Samutra. The Tangoon Minister of the Interior Balthasar stated
"the deaths and spreading disease are God's way of cleansing Tangoon and
Samutra of those who are unworthy because they do not adhere to the true
form of the Tanmutran faith."80 In the eyes of the leaders, the disease ap-
pears to be a weapon wielded by God to kill the Samutrans. Whether the
international community should consider it to be a biological weapon as well
is a close question.
For guidance in answering this question, Canada may cite to the Conven-
tion on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.
The Convention provides that "each state. . . . undertakes never in any cir-
cumstance to . . . retain: Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins what-
ever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have
no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes." 8' If
the disease spreading from Tangoon can be equated to a biological weapon
according to the definition above, the U.N. Charter justifies using force in aid
" G.A. Res. 498 (V), U.N. Doc. A/RES/498 (Nov. 5, 1951).
80 U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Tangoon, 1
8, U.N. Doc. S/2011/5/30 (May 30, 2011).
81 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bac-
teriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction art. 1, Mar 26, 1975,
1015 U.N.T.S. 163.
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of Samutra because "nothing... shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the
United Nations." 82 To understand what qualifies as an armed attack, it is
helpful to look at the relevant classifications listed in the "Definition of Ag-
gression" Resolution, General Assembly Resolution 3314. In Article 3, ag-
gression is defined as "the use of any weapons by a state against the territory
of another state."83 Article 4 provides an even broader definition of aggres-
sion: "The acts enumerated above are not exhaustive and the Security Coun-
cil may determine that other acts constitute aggression under the provisions
of the Charter." 84
The United States, in turn, will argue that such an interpretation of Article
51 of the U.N. Charter is unprecedented and unfounded. While limited coun-
termeasures may be justified to prevent a sdurce of deadly pollution from
spreading downwind or downstream to another country, such action does not
include an armed invasion of the polluting State.
2. Was Canada's response necessary and proportionate? Did it unneces-
sarily violate religious practices regarding burial?
Canada's military response appears both necessary and proportionate, two
of the most basic metrics of jus in bello theory.8 5  The intransigence of
Tangoon's government in allowing access to typhoon victims by internation-
al relief efforts made the limited destruction of portions of the border wall
necessary. It appears the Canadian force destroyed no more of the wall than
was necessary to achieve their military objective and Canada took care to do
so in a way that resulted in only damaged infrastructure and no loss of life.
The only other reported damage to property by military activity was the disa-
bling of excavation equipment in Demonville. Most of the operation has not
required the Canadian commandos to use deadly force. In their only fire-
fight, the Canadians killed just ten Tangoon security personnel. This seems
to be an acceptable number of casualties, particularly considering that the
Canadian force was acting in self-defense in that instance. The Canadian
force's limited use of force seems well within the limits of proportionality.
On the other hand, the 1949 Geneva Conventions generally discourage
both cremation and mass burial of dead civilians, regardless of their religion.
This is partly grounded in the concept of respect for the dead, but also on the
more practical basis that it makes identification and re-burial difficult later.
The Geneva Conventions also encourage adherence to religious customs of
82 U.N. Charter art. 51.
G.A. 3314 (XXIX), art. 3, U.N. Doc. AIRES/3314 (Dec. 14, 1974).
84 Id. at art. 4.
85 YEHUDA MBLZER, CONCEPTS OF JUST WAR 91 (1975).
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the deceased. However, they clearly grant exceptions for protection of public
health and hygiene, particularly in the face of epidemic disease.86 Because of
the threat of continuing epidemic posed by the decomposing corpses, burning
them in contravention to ultra-orthodox Tanmutran beliefs appears to be jus-
tified, although it is unclear from the facts whether the Samutran aid workers
are meeting related requirements in regards to marking of mass graves, iden-
tification, and recording of deceased persons, etc. It is also worthwhile to
note that since most (though possibly not all) of the deceased typhoon vic-
tims were from the lower castes, and thus were not ultra-orthodox Tanmut-
rans, cremation would not even have been a violation of their individual reli-
gious beliefs.
II. WHETHER CANADA'S APPREHENSION, DETENTION,
AND PROPOSED SURRENDER TO THE ICC OF ISHMAEL
BALTHASAR AND CLYDE BARRETT ARE LAWFUL UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW?
A. Was the apprehension justified under the Law of War and Human Rights
Law?
1. Was Balthasar's apprehension justified under the law of war as a mili-
tary action to protect the aid convoy from attack?
It is not clear that International Humanitarian Law (the law of war) can be
used to justify the apprehension of Balthasar, because the laws of war apply
only in situations of armed conflict. Armed conflict can be defined as "a
situation where fighting takes place between the armed forces of two States
in an "international armed conflict"; or within the territory of a State between
its regular armed forces and organized armed groups or when such groups
fight one another in "internal" or "non-international armed conflict."87 In
this circumstance, the armed forces were present to protect the humanitarian
aid workers and were not there to engage in armed conflict. Furthermore,
there was no sustained fighting in Tangoon or between Canada and Tangoon.
On the other hand, the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel
resolution of the General Assembly established regulations and protections
for situations that are not armed conflicts but where U.N. personnel or con-
86 Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
art. 130, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 973; see also Geneva Convention (I) Amelioration of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 970 (providing
similar provisions for deceased combatants).
87 Alexandre Faite, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, Legal Considerations Regarding the
Protection ofHumanitarian Workers in the Field, in SECURE 02,38 (2002).
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tractual organizations are aiding humanitarian efforts.88 This resolution
states that "States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure the
safety and security of United Nations and associated personnel."89 The hu-
manitarian mission in Tangoon seems to fall within the scope of the resolu-
tion because the U.N. General Assembly recommended that "all necessary
means" to deliver humanitarian aid to the Tangoonise people should be used.
This case is similar to that of British U.N. forces who were assigned to pro-
tect aid convoys in Bosnia. When they were attacked by Bosnian Serb forces
in 1994, there was no question that they acted appropriately in returning
fire. 90 It stands to reason that if a party can use deadly force to protect an aid
convoy in a U.N. authorized operation, it should be able to capture its attack-
er to neutralize the threat as well.
2. Was Barrett's apprehension justified as a means to stop human rights
abuses in progress?
The evolution of customary international law has resulted in the designa-
tion of certain crimes as so heinous and of universal concern as to constitute
crimes against all mankind. These crimes originally included acts of piracy,
but have come to include genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes,
and, more recently, terrorism and torture. 91 It is presumed that those who
commit these crimes are hostis humani generis (enemies of all mankind) and
all the nations of the world are said to have the authority to apprehend and
prosecute them based on the concept of universal jurisdiction.9 2 Slavery has
long been considered a crime against humanity, and thus falls under the um-
brella of universally condemned crimes. The definition of slavery has been
expanded to include modern slave-like practices, such as forced or compulso-
ry labor, and many conventions and treaties have been established to work
towards the abolition of such practices. Additionally, the abuse of children
via forced or compulsory labor is considered a gross violation of internation-
al laws.
Canada will most likely begin by making the assertion that the slave-labor
like conditions experienced by the workers at the Geomin Corp mining site
constitutes a crime against humanity. At the very least, the designation of the
labor practices as a crime against humanity allowed the Canadian comman-
" G.A. Res. 49/59, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/59, at 1 (Feb. 17, 1995).
89 Id at art. 7.
9 Roger Cohen, Bosnia Serbs Attack Aid Convoy; UN. Rejects NATO Strike, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 19, 1994, at A6.
91 Kenneth Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REv. 785,
786 (1988).
92 Curtis A. Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and US. Law, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 323, 324
(2001).
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dos to intervene under the premise of universal jurisdiction to stop the human
rights abuses occurring in their presence. Article 4 of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, in recognizing the equal and inalienable rights of all
humans, declares that "[n]o one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery
and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms."9 While originally
envisaged as the exercise of ownership over the person of another, the ILO
Convention 29: Forced or Compulsory Labor (1932) expanded the term
"slavery" to include forced or compulsory labor, meaning "all work or ser-
vice which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and
for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily."
Canada will argue that even though the workers were operating under the
guise of Tangoon's "National Service Program," this program is a mere front
for their compulsory and forced labor. Furthermore, while Tangoon's cultur-
al history includes a sharp division between the orthodox elite and non-elites,
cultural legacy does not entitle the elites to exemption from laws banning
slavery; there are legitimate, substantive limitations on cultural practices,
even on well-entrenched traditions. Accordingly, all forms of slavery, in-
cluding contemporary slavery-like practices, are a gross violation of human
rights under international law. Since all nations are obliged to stop the com-
mission of certain universally condemned crimes, including slavery, Canada
will argue that its forces were justified in their apprehension of Clyde Barrett.
Canada will bolster its case by pointing out that the workers for the min-
ing site included hundreds of teenage boys and girls. ILO Convention 182:
The Worst Forms of Child Labour (June 17, 1999) defines a "child" as all
persons under the age of 18, and considers "forced or compulsory labor" to
be one of the worst forms of child labor seen throughout the world. Article 1
of the Convention goes on to state that "[e]ach Member which ratifies this
Convention shall take immediate and effective measures to secure the prohi-
bition and elimination of the worst forms of child labour as a matter of ur-
gency." Canada, who along with the United States ratified the convention,
was thus obliged to step in and stop the human rights abuses taking place via
forced child labor.
The United States may argue that there is no proof that the work condi-
tions were some form of "slave labor." Since Canada is using the claim as an
affirmative defense to a prima facie violation of international law, Canada
bears the burden of proving its claim. Here, there is no proof that the condi-
tions experienced by the teens working in the mine are so horrible so as to be
worse than the everyday conditions experienced by those children who are
not working there. The United States may cite Flomo v. Firestone Natural
Rubber, a case where twenty-three Liberian children brought suit against the
9 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(II1) (Dec. 10, 1948).
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Firestone rubber plantation operated in Liberia alleging conditions of forced
child labor.94 Despite testimony that these children worked in slave-like
conditions and suffered from malnutrition, disease, physical ailments from
exposure to chemicals, and the lack of decent educational opportunities, the
court eventually found it had not been given an adequate basis for inferring a
violation of customary international law.95 The main reasoning behind the
decision was that the court did not know the welfare of those children who
did not work on the plantation compared to the net effect on their welfare of
those working on the plantation. Conceivably, the Court reasoned, those on
the plantation may have been "better off than the average Liberian child." 96
The United States may make a similar argument here.
Furthermore, even ifa violation of human rights can be found in the work
conditions of the Geomin Corp mine, the United States will argue that Clyde
Barrett cannot be held liable (and taken into custody) for these violations.
Because the laborers were provided to Clyde Barrett and Geomin Corp.
through the government of Tangoon, in order to be liable it would have to be
shown that Barrett was legally responsible for the forced labor practices of
the Tangoon government. In Doe v. Unocal Corp, charges were brought
against Unocal for forced labor practices in the building of a gas pipeline in
Myanmar. 97 The workers were supplied to the company by the Myanmar
military, and the company was well aware of the practices being used. The
Court eventually found that mere knowledge of the labor abuses was not
enough to constitute liability. Rather, "liability requires participation or co-
operation in the forced labor practices."98 Neither Unocal in Doe nor Ge-
omin and Clyde Barrett in the case at hand initiated the obtaining of forced
labor or controlled the recruitment. Thus, the United States will argue that
because Clyde Barrett has no control over the government of Tangoon,
which created and maintained the conditions of slave-labor, he could not
justifiably have been apprehended in order to stop the abuses.
Canada may respond that the Clyde Barrett could still be liable for aiding
and abetting the commission of the abuses. In the appeal of Doe, the court
held that Unocal could potentially fulfill the actus reus and mens rea re-
quirements of aiding and abetting.99 Because Unocal gave "practical assis-
tance or encouragement" in the form of money, photos, maps, and surveys to
the Myanmar military which had a "substantial effect of the perpetration of
the crime," the court reasoned this could fulfill the actus reus requirement.
94 Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co. LLC, 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011).
9 Id. at 1025.
96 Id
9 Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
9 Id at 1310.
9 John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002).
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Additionally, Unocal knew of the use of forced labor and therefore could
have (or should have) known that their assistance to the military would en-
courage the continued use of the labor violations, satisfying the mens rea
requirement of aiding and abetting.'00 Canada could similarly argue that the
offer to increase the annual license fee to the regime in Tangoon by $50 mil-
lion for the second mine satisfies the actus reus requirement through "practi-
cal assistance or encouragement which has a substantial effect of the perpe-
tration of the crime." Since Clyde Barrett was present at the mining opera-
tion at the time, Canada could argue that he would have known of the use of
child slave-labor and known the second mine would encourage its use.
Therefore, Canada may argue that even if no direct liability exists, it is still
reasonable to assert that Barrett could be charged with aiding and abetting
the commission of the crime.
B.Was the detention lawful under the Mala Captus bene detentis doctrine?
IfBalthsar's and Barrett's initial apprehensions were unlawful, is their
detention nonetheless lawful because there was a subsequent ICC arrest
warrant? In other words, does the mala captus bene detentis principle apply
to the ICC?
If it is determined that the apprehension of Balthsar and Barrett by Cana-
dian forces was unlawful under the circumstances, there still is the question
of whether they can nonetheless be lawfully detained by virtue of the ICC
arrest warrants. The principle of mala captus bene detentus (unjust capture,
but fair detention) states that "a person improperly seized may nevertheless
properly be detained."o'0 This principle has fallen into disfavor throughout
the international legal community, since it tends to erode confidence in the
rule of law and opens the door to using abduction as a 'shortcut' alternative
to extradition.102 Discomfort with the concept of mala captus bene detentus
has significantly intensified in response to the United States' use of"extraor-
dinary rendition" in its prosecution of the war on terrorism. 0 3
The Rome Statute of the ICC neither explicitly permits nor forbids the
appearance of an illegally obtained suspect before the Court. It provides no
clear guidance on how to extradite persons from conflict zones with no func-
tioning government or from non-party States. Its procedures for the arrest
and surrender of persons to the Court are written generally under the assump-
'oo Id. at 953.
101 Michael P. Scharf, The Prosecutor v. Slavko Dokmanovic: Irregular Rendition and the
ICTY, 11 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 369, 379 (1998).
102 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION 324-25 (2007).
103 Id. at 289-94.
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tion that the requested State is a willing and able partner in the administration
of justice with a competent law enforcement authority.' 04 The ICC's under-
lying purpose of promoting the rule of law, taken in concert with the prevail-
ing rejection of mala captus bene detentus, would seem to indicate the Court
should not find the detention of Balthsar and Barrett to be lawful if their ap-
prehension was unlawful.
An oft-cited special case, however, is the "Eichmann exception," where
the accused's conduct was so heinous as to permit his abduction to be "de-
coupled" from his trial.'os If the ICC and Canada wish to pursue Balthsar
and Barrett as exceptionally blameworthy international criminals, they argu-
ably can pursue the conviction and apologize for the capture later. In Eich-
mann's case, the Security Council censured Israel's abduction of Eichmann
and required Israel to make "appropriate reparation" to Argentina, which
readily accepted Israel's apology, but the Council did not require that Eich-
mann be returned to Argentina.10 6
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia applied
the Eichmann exception in the Nicolic Case. Nicolic had been abducted
from his home in Serbia, and argued that the Tribunal should dismiss his case
to uphold his human rights. The Tribunal held instead that, given the grave
charges, dismissal would be an inappropriate remedy.' 0 7
It will be particularly hard for the United States to prevail on this issue,
since the U.S. Supreme Court itself has endorsed the concept of mala captus
bene detentus in U.S. v. Alvarez-Machain.s0 8 The controversial case involved
a Mexican national abducted in Mexico by private Mexican nationals under
the direction of agents of the U. S. Drug Enforcement Administration. The
Court held that because the extradition treaty between the U. S. and Mexico
did not specifically prohibit abduction, "the court need not inquire as to how
the respondent [Alvarez-Machain] came before it."l 09
C. Can the ICC exercise jurisdiction over nationals of a non-party state who
take action in the territory of a non-party state if the result is massive deaths
within the territory of a State Party to the ICC Statute?
There are two main issues at hand: First, does the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties prevent the ICC from exercising jurisdiction over the
10 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 24.
1os Scharf, supra note 101, at 381.
106 Id
107 Prosecutor v. Nicolic, Decision on Defence Motion Challenging the Exercise of Juris-
diction by the Tribunal, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, (Oct. 9, 2002),
htt://www.icty.org/x/cases/nikolic dragan/tdec/en/10131553.htm.
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
'09 Id. at 662.
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nationals of non-party States? Second, if no violation exists, does the objec-
tive territorial basis of jurisdiction (the effects test) apply to the question of
whether an act was committed within the territory of a State Party to the
ICC?
The drafters of the ICC Statute decided not to give the Court universal ju-
risdiction, despite the fact that the crimes within its competence are crimes of
universal jurisdiction under international law. Instead, the ICC Statute (Arti-
cle 12) gives the Court jurisdiction over nationals of State parties, and non-
party nationals who commit crimes within the territory of a State party. "o In
addition, Article 13 allows the ICC to prosecute non-party nationals when the
situation is referred to the prosecutor by the Security Council, "irrespective
of the nationality of the accused or the location of the crime."'
Ishmael Balthasar and Clyde Barrett are accused of conspiring to commit
a crime against humanity in the region of Tangoon, which resulted in effects
equivalent to a biological attack on neighboring Samutra. Both Balthasar
and Barrett are nationals of states not party to the ICC Statute, and all alleged
criminal action took place within the territory of a state also not a party to the
statute. While the crisis in Tangoon was brought before the Security Coun-
cil, no subsequent action was taken.
The United States will argue that, in the absence of Security Council au-
thorization, the ICC's exercise of jurisdiction over the defendants without the
consent of their states of nationality would represent a violation of the Vien-
na Convention on the Law of Treaties.1 2 Article 34 of the Vienna Conven-
tion states that "a treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third
State without its consent."3
Canada will point out that the Special Court for Sierra Leone provides a
precedent for the ICC's exercise of jurisdiction in this case. The Special
Court for Sierra Leone, a treaty based international court, upheld the indict-
ment for Charles Taylor, the Head of State for the neighboring state of Libe-
ria in respect of his participation in the armed conflict in Sierra Leone."14
Despite the fact that Taylor was a citizen of Liberia, which was not a state
not party to the treaty, the indictment received wide support, including from
the United States, and was upheld by the SCSL Appeals Chamber.
110 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 24, at art. 12.
" Jurisdiction and Admissibility, INT'L CRIM. COURT, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+Court/ICC+at+a+glance/Jurisdiction+and+Admissibility.htm
(last visited Sept. 15, 2011).
112 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 1.
113 Id. at art 34.
114 The Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, The Special Court for Sierra Leone,
http://www.sc-s.org/CASES/ProsecutorvsCharlesTaylor/tabid/107/Default.aspx (last visited
Nov. 16, 2012).
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Further, Canada may point out that the United States is party to a number
of treaties that create universal jurisdiction over terrorists without concern
about whether the State of nationality is a party to the Convention. In United
States v. Yunis, the United States prosecuted a Lebanese national accused of
hijacking a Jordanian airliner that had two American hostages on board.' 15 In
that case, the United States based its jurisdiction on the International Con-
vention on the Taking of Hostages, despite the fact that Lebanon was not
party to this treaty.
Even if the ICC can properly exercise jurisdiction over non-party nation-
als for crimes committed in the territory of a State party, the United States
will argue that the alleged crime in this case was committed in Tangoon,
which is not a party to the ICC, and there was no intent for the crime to have
an effect on neighboring Samutra. Canada will respond that the Secretary-
General put Tangoon on notice that the failure by the government in
Tangoon to provide medicine to the sick and injured, and refusal to dispose
of bodies contaminating shared water resources, had the effect of a direct
biological attack on the people of Samutra. As such, the crime was commit-
ted both in Tangoon and in Samutra, under the principle of objective territo-
riality. The notion of objective territoriality declares that a state may exer-
cise jurisdiction over a crime committed extraterritorially "as long as the
harmful effect(s) or result(s) take place within the jurisdiction's territorial
boundaries." 1 6 The objective territoriality principle is designed to "punish
the perpetrator of conduct which causes harm within the territory of the fo-
rum state, even though none of the conduct occurs there."" 7 Being party to
the Rome Statute, Samutra may then delegate this territorial jurisdiction to
the ICC.
One of the most well-known and oft-cited cases of the use of the objective
territoriality principle is the Lotus case, which Canada is likely to bring up." 8
In Lotus, Turkey prosecuted a French ship pilot after his ship, the S.S. Lotus,
collided with a Turkish vessel resulting in the loss of eight Turkish lives.'19
Turkey based its objective territoriality jurisdiction on the fact that the "ef-
fects of the pilot's conduct had caused harmful effects on the Turkish ves-
sel."1 20 France objected, claiming the "flag state alone had jurisdiction in
such cases and that Turkey could not legitimately try a French citizen under
international law" without proving their jurisdiction. The Permanent Court
" United States v. Yunis, 924 F. 2d. 1086 (1991).
116 Christopher L. Blakesley, United States Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Crime, 73 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1109, 1123 (1982).
117 Id. at 1125.
' S.S. Lotus, (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7).
l9 Id.
120 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL
ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS 2 (2008).
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of International Justice "rejected France's argument, ruling that the burden
was on France to demonstrate that Turkey's exercise of jurisdiction violated
some prohibitive rule of international law."'21 Since no rule existed to prove
otherwise, Turkey was able to establish objective territorial jurisdiction based
on the direct effects experienced by the Turkish vessel. Furthermore, the
Lotus case demonstrates that the exercise of objective territorial jurisdiction
may only be denied if "any international legal rule exists that would prohibit
it."l 22
The U.S. Supreme Court Opinion in Strassheim v. Daily, which although
not binding precedent in the case at hand, helps demonstrate that the United
States practices objective territoriality in its own proceedings.123 The Court
is Strassheim held that "[a]cts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to
produce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a state in punish-
ing the cause of the harm."' 24 Furthermore, the United States regularly uses
the effects theory to prosecute narcotics cases where "the criminal acts oc-
curred abroad so long as the drugs were intended to be distributed within the
United States."l25 For instance, in Chua Ilan Mow v. United States, a Malay-
sian citizen, who was in Malaysia at the time, was charged by the United
States for importing and distributing heroin.12 6 The United States established
jurisdiction based on objective territoriality, finding that the defendant had
intended to create a detrimental effect in the United States and committed
acts which resulted in such an effect when the heroin unlawfully entered the
country.127 The principles behind objective territorial jurisdiction have also
been extended to apply to acts committed by nations that threaten the sover-
eignty of other nations by producing detrimental acts within them.12 8
The United States will not deny its use of the objective territoriality prin-
ciple and will instead counter that the drafters of the ICC Statute did not in-
tend for the ICC to exercise jurisdiction based on this principle. The negoti-
ating record is unclear on this point, and the ICC has not yet asserted juris-
diction in a case based solely on the objective territorial principle. Canada
will point out, however, that the Special Court for Sierra Leone's case
against Charles Taylor is based on the objective territorial principle, and that
the United States has been a strong supporter of the Taylor prosecution.
121 Scharf, supra note 101.
122 id
123 Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280 (1911).
124 Id. at 285
125 Scharf, supra note 101.
126 Chan Han Mow v. United States, 730 F. 2d. 1308 (1984).
127 Id. at 1312.
128 Rocha v. United States, 288 F. 2d. 545 (1961).
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D. Did Canada violate Balthasar's Head of State immunity when it captured
and/or subsequently detained him for eventual surrender to the ICC?
1. Does Head of State immunity apply to a defacto Head ofState who is
not the dejure Head ofState?
International law accords sitting Heads of State immunity from arrest, de-
tention, and prosecution. This immunity applies to all of the leader's activi-
ties, whether they are performed in an official capacity or private capacity.
However, Head of State immunity is not accorded to de facto leaders who are
not formally recognized by the territorial State. Thus, in the 1997 trial of
former de facto dictator of Panama, Manuel Noriega, the United States'
Eleventh Circuit Federal Court of Appeals held that a foreign leader is only
entitled to immunity in U.S. courts if the U.S. government formally recog-
nized the leader.129 The court further found that Head of State immunity is
granted to the individual that the Executive Branch recognizes as the legiti-
mate head of state, irrespective of whether the leader exercises de facto con-
trol. 130
In this case, Raffliki Balthasar continues to hold the official title Head of
State of Tangoon, though he has passed de facto power over to his younger
brother Ishmael Balthasar. Since neither Canada nor Samutra recognize
Ishmael Balthasar as the Head of State of Tangoon, Canada will argue that he
is not entitled to any immunity.
In the Belgium Arrest Warrant Case, the International Court of Justice
declared that "in international law it is firmly established that, as also diplo-
matic and consular agents, certain holders of high-ranking office in a State,
such as the Head of State, Head of Government and Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs, enjoy immunities from jurisdiction in other States, both civil and crimi-
nal." 3 1 The ICJ thus held that an arrest warrant issued by Belgium against
the sitting Foreign Minister of the Congo violated international law. Draw-
ing from this precedent, the United States may argue that Balthasar formally
holds the title of Minister of the Interior, but has broader powers equivalent
to a Minister of Foreign Affairs. For example, the Compromis indicates that
he had the power to enter into a multi-million dollar contract to sell mining
rights to foreign investors. As such, the Arrest Warrant Case suggests that
Ishmael Balthasar would be entitled to the same type of personal immunity
as a sitting Head of State.
129 United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997).
130 Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F.Supp. 128, 132 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) ("Recognition of a gov-
ernment and its officers is the exclusive function of the Executive Branch.").
131 HAZEL Fox, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 19 (2008).
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2. Does Head of State immunity apply to persons captured for trial by the
ICC?
The United States will argue that Balthasar's Head of State immunity ap-
plies both to prosecution in national courts and to proceedings in national
courts to surrender him to the ICC.
Since Balthasar is detained in a Canadian vessel, arguably he is being
held by Canada. But since the ship is docked at Samutra's port, that country
may be viewed as the custodial state. Either way, since both are parties to
the ICC, Canada will argue that Balthasar is not entitled to Head of State
immunity because Article 27 of the ICC Statute declares that there is no sov-
ereign immunity from ICC Prosecution.' 32
The United States may argue that Article 27 only applies to prosecution
by the ICC, not to proceedings in national courts. This argument is bolstered
by Article 98 of the Rome Statute, which states:
The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assis-
tance which would require the requested State to act inconsistent-
ly with its obligations under international law with respect to the
State or diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a third
state. . .
ICC party nations including Kenya, Chad, and Djibouti have cited this
provision in refusing to arrest Omar Al-Bashir during his visits, despite the
ICC warrant for his arrest.' 34 The ICC has reported these State Parties' fail-
ure to arrest Al-Bashir to the Security Council, but the Security Council has
yet to act.135
Most recently, with respect to Malawi's failure to arrest Al-Bashir when
he visited that country, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber stated, "the principle in
international law is that immunity of either former or sitting Heads of State
cannot be invoked to oppose a prosecution by an international court. This is
equally applicable to former or sitting Heads of States not Parties to the Stat-
ute whenever the Court may exercise jurisdiction."' 3 6
Thus, Canada will argue that Head of State immunity is abrogated even
with respect to action taken by national authorities, where those authorities
132 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 24, at art. 27.
1 Id. at art. 98.
134 Djibouti Becomes 3rd ICC Member to Receive Sudanese President, SUDAN TRIB., May
11,2011, http://www.sudantribune.com/Djibouti-becomes-third-ICC-member,38809.
135 id
136 Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-139, Pre-Trial
Chamber 1,T 36, (Dec. 12, 2011).
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are acting in accordance with the ICC's request. 37 This position is justified
because reading Article 27 as applicable only to actions by the ICC would
leave parts of the provisions meaningless. This is because the Court is forced
to rely on national authorities to carry out its arrest warrants. If Head of
State immunity were to be left intact with respect to arrests by national au-
thorities, Article 27's declaration that immunities shall not bar the exercise of
jurisdiction by the Court would be inapplicable and the Court would be una-
ble to exercise its jurisdiction.13 8 In addition, the text of Article 27(2) states
itself that not only international law immunities, but also national law im-
munities, shall not bar the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction.
' Id. at 337-38.
13 Id. at 338.
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